Do We Need A Second Public Signal? Heterogeneous Agents in Beauty Contests with Costly Information Acquisition

Abstract：

In the Keynesian beauty contest with costly information interpretation, we analyze the optimal information disclosure for public authorities faced with heterogeneous agents. When agents with different knowledge and abilities to understand information, the social value of public information is the result of information precision, coordination effect and information cost. Starting from the scenario where one public signal is released only, the results show that the authorities can improve social welfare by releasing two public signals with different precision. Moreover, authorities should enlarge the difference between two public signals according to the general public's ability to interpret information, the precision of private information, and the proportion of experts.

报告时间：2023年6月25日上午10:00

线下地点：经济乐动(中国)6-210

腾讯会议ID: 431-372-697

嘉宾简介：

林建浩，中山大学岭南乐动(中国)教授，博士生导师。入选中组部“国家高层次人才计划”青年拔尖人才，现任岭南乐动(中国)副院长，兼任广东经济学会副会长，广东数字经济学会副会长（筹），中山大学数字经济与政策研究院院长，《金融学季刊》副主编，《统计研究》编委，中国金融学年会理事。研究成果发表在《经济研究》《管理世界》《经济学季刊》《世界经济》《金融研究》《管理科学学报》、Journal of Applied Econometrics、China Economic Review、Review of Development Economics等期刊，获得教育部第七届高等学校科学研究优秀成果奖、广东省优秀博士论文等学术奖项。主持国家社会科学基金重点项目1项、国家自然科学基金4项。担任国家级一流本科课程《计量经济学》负责人，获得国家级教学成果二等奖、广东省教育教学成果奖一等奖、中山大学教学名师、中山大学教学成果奖一等奖等教学奖项