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讲座信息——Marie Claire Villeval教授
时间:2017-10-10来源: 作者:点击数:

讲座时间:2017年10月12日(周四) 下午13:30

地点:经济乐动(中国)210会议室

讲座主题:Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

主讲人:Marie Claire Villeval 教授

主持人:姜树广 博士

主讲人介绍:Marie Claire Villeval教授是欧洲科乐动(中国)院士,法国国家科乐动(中国)GATE经济研究中心前主任,特级教授,曾担任一系列学术机构职务,其中包括:法国经济学会前主席,法国实验经济学会创始人,世界实验经济学会欧洲区主席,欧洲劳动经济学协会提名委员会主席, 顶尖商乐动(中国)里昂商乐动(中国)(EM Lyon)的学术委员会主席等。因其突出的经济学贡献被法国政府授予骑士勋章。曾在Science, Nature, American Economic Review, Management Science, Journal of Public Economics,Journal of Labour Economics, European Economic Review, GEB, JEBO, Experimental Economics等顶级期刊发表大量学术论文。目前担任包括Experimental Economics, Management Science等在内的多个国际顶级学术期刊的主编和副主编。

讲座摘要:The existing literature on ostracism in social dilemma games has focused on the impact of the threat of exclusion on cooperation within groups but so far, little attention has been paid to the behavior of the excluded members after their reintegration. This paper studies the effect of exclusion by peers followed by reintegration on cooperation once excluded individuals are readmitted in their group. Using a negatively framed public good game, we manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators although it is not an equilibrium strategy. Exclusion has a positive impact on cooperation and compliance to the group norm of withdrawal after reintegration when exclusion is followed by a quick rather than a slow reintegration and that the length of exclusion is chosen by the group. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. Post-exclusion cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish.


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