Repeated Selection and Behavior-Based Discriminatory Pricing

Abstract：

This article investigates behavior-based price discrimination in a repeated buying model, where consumers must obtain complete information through consumption. In each period, consumers have the option to directly purchase a reservation product with complete information or to blindly purchase a new product with incomplete information. We demonstrate that firms typically charge new consumers a higher price than returning customers, assuming that consumers can observe prices for both new and returning customers. An increase in the posterior value and quality of a product may intensify price discrimination, while an increase in switching costs has no effect on price discrimination. Furthermore, while the price for new consumers is higher than that for returning consumers, firms will charge higher prices to returning consumers as the number of purchases increases.

报告时间：2024年9月19日，下午2:00        

线下地点：经济乐动(中国)6-210 会议室

主办单位：浙江财经大学数量经济研究中心、乐动

嘉宾简介：

林凯，浙江财经大学数量经济研究中心成员，经济乐动(中国)讲师，上海财经大学经济学博士。主要研究领域为微观经济理论，产业组织理论，尤其是消费者搜寻和平台经济学。研究成果发表在Games and Economic Behavior，荣获“2021年当代经济学博士创新项目”。